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CASE NOTE
CIVIL PROCEDURE—The Wyoming Supreme Court Constricts the Public
Interest Exception of the Declaratory Judgments Act; William F. West Ranch,
L.L.C. v. Tyrrell, 206 P.3d 722 (Wyo. 2009)
Amy M. Staehr*

INTRODUCTION
The William West Ranch and the Turner Family (the Wests and the Turners)
own tracts of land in Wyoming’s Powder River Basin.1 The Wests alleged that
by 2007 they were no longer able to normally irrigate their land because saline
and sodic water from nearby coalbed methane (CBM) wells had inﬁltrated their
local water supply, resulting in plant and soil damage.2 Additionally, leaking
CBM water stored in reservoirs had further harmed the soil and vegetation on the
West Ranch.3 The Turners claimed several of the wells they use for domestic and
agricultural purposes had either dried up or threatened to as a result of the CBM
ground water pumping in their area.4
Based on these alleged injuries, the Wests and the Turners ﬁled a complaint
with the district court seeking a declaratory judgment stating Wyoming State
Engineer Patrick Tyrrell and the Wyoming Board of Control had acted unlawfully
and in violation of the Wyoming Constitution in permitting CBM wells and
reservoirs.5 The district court dismissed the case, and the Wests and the Turners

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2011. My sincerest thanks to Professor Dennis
Stickley and Professor Lawrence MacDonnell for their insightful comments. Additionally, a special
thank you to the entire Wyoming Law Review editorial board for their helpful thoughts and guidance
throughout this process.
1

William F. West Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tyrrell, 206 P.3d 722, 725 (Wyo. 2009).

2

Brief of Appellants at ix, William West Ranch, 206 P.3d 722 (No. S-08-0161), 2008 WL
5041670.
3

Id.

4

Brief of Pennaco Energy Inc. & Devon Energy Production Co. as Appellees at 2, William
West Ranch, 206 P.3d 722 (No. S-08-0161), 2008 WL 6559519 [hereinafter Brief of Pennaco].
5
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 725. In Wyoming, the State Engineer issues permits for
wells to extract CBM water as well as permits for reservoirs in which to store CBM water. WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-3-930 to -931 (2009); STATE ENGINEER’S OFFICE, GUIDANCE: CBM/GROUND WATER
PERMITS 1–2 (2004), available at http://seo.state.wy.us/PDF/GW_CBM_Guidance.pdf; STATE
ENGINEER’S OFFICE, PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH OFF-CHANNEL CONTAINMENT
PITS 1 (2002), available at http://seo.state.wy.us/PDF/ OffChannelContainReq.pdf. For additional
information on the CBM water regulatory process, see infra notes 27–35 and accompanying text.
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appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.6 Finding the landowners did not
present a justiciable controversy, the court afﬁrmed the district court’s dismissal.7
The landowners premised their justiciable controversy argument on the
public interest exception, which recognizes a relaxed version of standing in cases
where the public interest is affected.8 Because the regulation of water in an arid
Western state is almost surely a matter of great public interest, the landowners
argued they need not explicitly satisfy all four prongs of the Brimmer test—a
tool to assess justiciability in Wyoming ﬁrst articulated in Brimmer v. Thomson.9
The court, however, disagreed with the plaintiff landowners and found not only
that the landowners failed to meet the second Brimmer element, but that all four
elements of the Brimmer test must be met even in cases concerning the public
interest.10 As a result, the Wyoming Supreme Court held the landowners failed
to establish a justiciable controversy because (1) they did not allege an injury that
would be practically redressed by the court’s ruling, and (2) they failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.11
This case note analyzes the Wyoming Supreme Court’s application of the
Brimmer test to establish a justiciable controversy in William West Ranch.12 The
background section looks brieﬂy at the coalbed methane industry in Wyoming’s
Powder River Basin, as well as the regulations governing CBM wastewater
disposal.13 Next, this note explores the requirements for establishing justiciability

6
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 726. The district court held the plaintiffs did not present a
justiciable controversy because other sectors of the government were currently considering the issue
and because the issue concerned a political question. Id. at 725.
7

Id.

8

Id. at 736; Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 7–8.

9

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 727, 736; Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo.
1974) (quoting Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 496 P.2d 512, 517 (Wash. 1972)). The test reads as
follows:
First, a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine,
as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy
must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as
distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, administrative,
philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a controversy the judicial
determination of which will have the force and effect of a ﬁnal judgment in law or
decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships . . . or, wanting
these qualities be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute
the legal equivalent of all of them. Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely
adversary in character and not a mere disputation . . . .
Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578.
10

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 737.

11

Id. at 738.

12

See infra notes 174–218 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 21–35 and accompanying text.
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in a declaratory judgment action.14 Particular attention is given to the requirement
that, under certain circumstances, plaintiffs must exhaust alternative remedies
before bringing a declaratory judgment action.15 Finally, this note explores
the public interest exception and its purported relaxation of justiciability
requirements, including an investigation into the Wyoming Supreme Court’s
relevant precedential cases.16 This note argues that the speciﬁcity the landowners’
pleadings lacked in William West Ranch was also lacking in earlier cases in which
the court found a justiciable controversy.17 In stating that plaintiffs had a duty
to allege facts speciﬁcally demonstrating how the court’s decision would remedy
their speciﬁc harm, the court imposed a more rigid burden on pleadings than
called for in the past.18 Additionally, by acknowledging the landowners in William
West Ranch brought a claim implicating an issue of great public interest and yet
failing to extend the court’s jurisdiction, the court departed from precedential case
law invoking the exception.19 In holding that under the public interest exception
all four Brimmer elements must be met, the Wyoming Supreme Court constricted
the exception’s intended jurisdiction-granting role.20

BACKGROUND
Wyoming’s Powder River Basin has seen an explosion of coalbed methane
(CBM) production since the late 1980s; this increasingly-prevalent method of gas
extraction involves drilling into and dewatering unmineable coal seams, thereby
releasing methane gas.21 The main by-product of the process is a large quantity of
often saline water.22 The Powder River Basin CBM wells produce relatively high
quality water that is often potable, although it can be unsuitable for irrigation
14

See infra notes 36–124 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 40–43, 82–89, 154–73 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 90–118 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 193–218 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 193–218 and accompanying text.

21

Anne MacKinnon & Kate Fox, Demanding Beneﬁcial Use: Opportunities and Obligations for
Wyoming Regulators in Coalbed Methane, 6 WYO. L. REV. 369, 370 (2006).
22
Sharon Buccino & Steve Jones, Controlling Water Pollution From Coalbed Methane Drilling:
An Analysis of Discharge Permit Requirements, 4 WYO. L. REV. 559, 562–63 (2004). In 2005 alone,
the Powder River Basin wells produced 72,000 acre-feet of water—an amount equal to a ﬁve-year
supply of water for the city of Cheyenne; this amount is expected to double by 2014. Kate Fox,
The Problem of Water as Waste, 2008 No. 1 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. Paper 16, 1 (2008). Use of
saline water in large quantities on crop or grazing land can adversely affect clay-based soils such
as those in the Powder River Basin by altering the soil’s water absorption rate and ability to drain,
thereby compromising crop growth and yield. JAN M.H. HENDRICKX & BRUCE A. BUCHANAN,
EXPERT SCIENTIFIC OPINION ON THE TIER-2 METHODOLOGY: REPORT TO THE WYOMING DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 3–11 (2009), available at http://deq.state.wy.us/out/downloads/
Final_Report_WY_DEQ_sep_21_2009.pdf.
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because it is harmful to plants and certain soils in large amounts.23 A number of
options exist for handling CBM water including discharge into drainage systems,
use as a municipal water supply, release directly onto the land, reinjection of the
water back into deep geological formations, storage in a series of pools that rely
on evaporation rather than seepage as a disposal method, or treatment to remove
sodium.24 Most producers in the Powder River Basin discharge CBM water into
drainage systems, onto the soil as irrigation, or into unlined storage reservoirs.25
Currently, CBM water is almost universally managed as a waste product of gas
production; however, as a scarce resource in an arid state, it is widely argued that
CBM water should be regulated and made use of as a valuable resource in and of
itself.26

23
U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Fact Sheet 2006-3137, Coalbed Methane
Extraction and Soil Suitability Concerns in the Powder River Basin, Montana and Wyoming, ¶ 3
(2006), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3137/pdf/fs06-3137_508.pdf. The quality of
CBM water is generally discussed in terms of total dissolved solids, sodium absorption ratio, and
electrical conductivity, all of which are dependant upon the inorganic salt content of the water.
THE RUCKELSHAUS INST. OF ENV’T & NATURAL RES., WATER PRODUCTION FROM COALBED METHANE
DEVELOPMENT IN WYOMING: A SUMMARY OF QUANTITY, QUALITY AND MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 17
(Univ. of Wyo. 2005) [hereinafter RUCKELSHAUS REPORT]. The quality of water extracted in CBM
production generally deteriorates the deeper the wells are drilled. Samuel S. Bacon, Comment, Why
Waste Water? A Bifurcated Proposal for Managing, Utilizing, and Proﬁting From Coalbed Methane
Discharged Water, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 577 (2009). The Powder River Basin’s coal seams tend
to be shallow, thus the extracted water is of relatively high quality. Id. at 579. While this water can be
used for domestic uses and stock watering, it nevertheless poses signiﬁcant risks to plants and crops
in large quantities, making it unsuitable for irrigation unless it is properly managed. Id. at 577–78;
HENDRICKX & BUCHANAN, supra note 22, at 20.
24

Bacon, supra note 23, at 576–77.

Buccino & Jones, supra note 22, at 570–71; RUCKELSHAUS REPORT, supra note 23, at vii.
Storage reservoirs are designed to be permeable, allowing CBM water to migrate back to the water
table; however, the water seeping out of such reservoirs generally ends up in a higher water table
with better quality water than that from which it was originally pulled, impacting the quality of
the higher water table. See Buccino & Jones, supra note 22, at 571. Additionally, these reservoirs
often double as stock watering ponds (in fact, their potential as stock watering ponds has led to the
current lack of an adjudication step in the permitting process for such reservoirs). Id.; see also infra
note 35 and accompanying text.
25

26
Colby Barrett, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round (Drill) Hole: The Evolving Legal Treatment
of Coalbed Methane-Produced Water in the Intermountain West, 38 Envtl. L. Rep.: News & Analysis
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,661, 10,662 (2008); Thomas F. Darin, Waste or Wasted?—Rethinking the
Regulation of Coalbed Methane Byproduct Water in the Rocky Mountains; A Comparative Analysis of
Approaches to Coalbed Methane Produced Water Quantity Legal Issues in Utah, New Mexico, Colorado,
Montana and Wyoming, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 281, 288–89, 341 (2002); Bacon, supra note
23, at 571–73; RUCKELSHAUS REPORT, supra note 23, at 42–54. See generally Neal Joseph Valorz,
Comment, The Need for Codiﬁcation of Wyoming’s Coal Bed Methane Produced Groundwater Laws,
10 WYO. L. REV. 115 (2010).
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Current Regulatory Structures for CBM Water
In Wyoming, CBM production is regulated by three state agencies: the
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (WOGCC), the Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ), and the State Engineer’s Ofﬁce (State Engineer).27
Responsibility lies with the WOGCC to permit “oil and gas well construction,
well spacing and density, and bonding and reclamation.”28 DEQ regulates the
quality of extracted CBM water according to the Clean Water Act (CWA) which
establishes minimum federal water quality standards and allows individual states
to further regulate, control, and enforce more stringent requirements.29 DEQ
issues permits for CBM water as a point-source pollutant subject to the Wyoming
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (WYPDES).30
The State Engineer is responsible for managing the quantity of produced CBM
water.31 The State Engineer categorizes CBM water as a type of groundwater.32
As such, it falls under the State’s prior appropriation system, which allows the
appropriation of groundwater if it is being stored or diverted for a beneﬁcial use in
the public interest.33 The State Engineer has determined the production of CBM

RUCKELSHAUS REPORT, supra note 23, at 33–35 (including additional information on the
regulatory and permitting process in Wyoming). Local environmental groups, as well as the federal
Environmental Protection Agency, consider Wyoming’s current regulatory scheme insufﬁcient.
Robert J. Duffy, Political Mobilization, Venue Change, and the Coal Bed Methane Conﬂict in Montana
and Wyoming, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 409, 434–35 (2005). This has not gone unnoticed: the
Wyoming legislature formed the Wyoming Coal Bed Natural Gas Water Management Task Force.
Wyoming CBM Water Management Task Force, Final Recommendations, Power Point, http://
governor.wy.gov/Media.aspx?MediaId=214 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). The Governor’s ofﬁce asked
the University of Wyoming to address a series of CBM-related questions. RUCKELSHAUS REPORT,
supra note 23, at 4. And the Environmental Quality Council (EQC), the rulemaking body of DEQ,
has worked towards adopting a rule embodying standards regarding water quality and discharge
quantity. Letter from John V. Cora, Director of DEQ, to Dennis Boal, Chairman of EQC (Sept.
23, 2009), available at http://deq.state.wy.us/out/downloads/cbmletter9.23.09.pdf. However, on
September 23, 2009, DEQ withdrew the proposed rule from consideration in response to a report
by two independent consultants that called into question the science behind the rule. Id.; see also
HENDRICKX & BUCHANAN, supra note 22, at ii.
27

28

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104(d) (2009); RUCKELSHAUS REPORT, supra note 23, at 34.

RUCKELSHAUS REPORT, supra note 23, at 34; Bacon, supra note 23, at 588. The objective of
the CWA is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
29

30

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1311(a), 1342; see also Bacon, supra note 23, at 582. In order to
delegate the WYPDES program to a state, the state must establish a scheme of citizen enforcement.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(e); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1001 (2009).
31

C. Stephen Herlihy, Comment, Trading Water for Gas: Application of the Public Interest
Review to Coalbed Methane Produced Water Discharge in Wyoming, 9 WYO. L. REV. 456, 462 (2009).
32

GUIDANCE: CBM/GROUND WATER PERMITS, supra note 5, at 1.

WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 3; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (2009); see also GUIDANCE: CBM/
GROUND WATER PERMITS, supra note 5, at 1.
33
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water is a beneﬁcial use; it therefore requires permitting.34 The State Engineer is
also responsible for issuing permits for CBM water put to an additional beneﬁcial
use or stored in on-channel reservoirs.35

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is a legal vehicle used to determine
rights, status, or other legal relationships between parties; its application is left to
the discretion of the courts; its purpose is remedial; and courts should construe
it liberally.36 For a court to have jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action,
a justiciable controversy must exist.37 While courts have tremendous discretion
in exercising their jurisdictional parameters, it is the court’s responsibility, as well
as the underlying logic behind stare decisis, that it make such decisions with an
eye towards precedent, as well as towards the future implications of its current
rulings.38 A court’s ﬁnding of whether a justiciable controversy exists is a threshold

34

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931 (2009).

GUIDANCE: CBM/GROUND WATER PERMITS, supra note 5, at 2; PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS
ASSOCIATED WITH OFF-CHANNEL CONTAINMENT PITS, supra note 5, at 2. Unlike with traditional
water rights, there is no adjudication process required for CBM water production or its storage in
reservoirs. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-935(b) (2009).
35

36
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-37-101, -103, -114 (2009);
Barber v. City of Douglas, 931 P.2d 948, 951 (Wyo. 1997) (“To accomplish its purpose, the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act is to be ‘liberally construed and administered.’” (quoting Brimmer v.
Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 577 (Wyo. 1974)); Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182,
1185 (Wyo. 1992) (“As a measure of preventive justice, the declaratory judgment . . . is designed
to enable parties to ascertain and establish their legal relations . . . .”); Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 577
(“Begrudging availability of the declaratory vehicle is inconsistent with the Act’s expressed remedial
tenor directed to the elimination of uncertainty and insecurity and the settlement of controversy.”).
37

Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 1980);
Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 728–29 (Wyo. 1975).
22A AM. JUR. 2D Declaratory Judgments § 15 (2009) [hereinafter Declaratory Judgments].
According to American Jurisprudence, Second Edition:
38

The grant or denial of relief in a declaratory judgment action is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court. This discretion entrusted to the courts must be
exercised judicially and cautiously, with due regard to all the circumstances of the
case. Discretion must not be arbitrary, but based on good reason and calculated to
serve the purposes for which the legislation was enacted—namely, to afford relief
from uncertainty and insecurity.
. . . However, the discretion of the court with regard to declaratory relief is
not unlimited, and where a complaint sets forth facts and circumstances showing
that a declaratory judgment is entirely appropriate, the court may not properly
refuse to assume jurisdiction.
Id.; see also Mem’l Hosp. of Laramie County v. Dep’t of Revenue & Taxation, 770 P.2d 223, 226
(Wyo. 1989) (“Declaratory relief should be liberally administered if the elements of a justiciable
controversy exist to give the trial court jurisdiction.”). Commenter Ann M. Rochelle notes, “What
constitutes a justiciable controversy will not always be clear. In the past, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has involved itself in the splitting of hairs when it comes to distinguishing a justiciable
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determination that includes a multiplicity of doctrines.39 Of these, the doctrines
of ripeness and standing deserve some attention.
Courts use the doctrine of ripeness to avoid premature adjudication.40 For
a controversy to be considered ripe, it is generally necessary for the litigant to
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing the case to court.41 Although the
existence of an alternative remedy does not always bar a plaintiff from seeking
a declaratory judgment, some courts will refrain from entertaining an action if
alternate remedies have not been exhausted.42 In Wyoming, courts base their
decision about whether alternate remedies must be exhausted on the type of claim
at issue.43
To establish standing in Wyoming, a party must demonstrate it is sufﬁciently
affected by the issue at hand, thereby ensuring the controversy presented to the
court is justiciable and the court has jurisdiction over the matter.44 The standing
doctrine requires the parties to have a tangible interest at stake that directly affects
them rather than one which is abstract or hypothetical.45 Wyoming case law

controversy from a nonjusticible one.” Comment, Wyoming’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act:
Statutory and Case Law Analysis, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 243, 267 (1981). According to Black’s
Law Dictionary, stare decisis is “[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court
to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” 1537 (9th ed.
2009).
39

Reiman, 838 P.2d at 1186 (“The doctrines include the political question doctrine, the
administrative questions doctrine, the advisory opinions doctrine, the feigned and collusive cases
doctrine, the doctrine of standing, the doctrine of ripeness, and the doctrine of mootness.”); W.
Texas Utils. Co. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 938 (Wyo. 1991); Anderson v. Wyo. Dev.
Co., 154 P.2d 318, 337–38 (Wyo. 1944).
40

BHP Petroleum Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Wyo. 1989).

2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 474 (2003); see also Rissler & McMurry Co. v. State,
917 P.2d 1157, 1162–63 (Wyo. 1996); Seckman v. Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161, 170 (Wyo. 1989);
BHP Petroleum, 766 P.2d at 1164.
41

42

Declaratory Judgments, supra note 38, at § 50.

WYO. R. CIV. P. 57 (“The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a
judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.”); see also, e.g., Bonnie M. Quinn
Revocable Trust v. SRW, Inc., 91 P.3d 146, 151–52 (Wyo. 2004) (holding that because the
landowners had not exhausted administrative remedies in challenging the CBM producer’s right
to drill exploratory wells on land zoned for agricultural purposes, judicial relief was not available);
Rocky Mtn. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1167–68 (Wyo. 1982) (stating in Wyoming
the availability of an alternate remedy will not alone preclude declaratory judgment relief ); infra
notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
43

44
Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd., 38 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo. 2002); see also Mem’l Hosp., 770
P.2d at 226; Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 316–17.
45

Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 317. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court:
Standing is a concept used to determine whether a party is sufﬁciently affected
to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court. It is a necessary
and useful tool to be used by courts in ferreting out those cases which ask the
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urges courts to liberally interpret the requirements for standing in a declaratory
judgment action; nevertheless, parties must present a justiciable controversy.46
The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, has recognized an exception which
states that if a great public interest is implicated in a case in which elements of
a justiciable controversy are lacking, the existence of a great public interest can
stand in as the legal equivalent of a justiciable controversy.47 Regarding a court’s
jurisdictional discretion, Professor Robert B. Keiter has characterized the standing
doctrine as “a highly abstract jurisdictional concept that the court periodically
invokes to avoid reaching the merits of cases otherwise properly before it.”48
In order to better understand Wyoming’s standing doctrine, a brief discussion
of its relationship to federal standing requirements is warranted. Article III
standing under the U.S. Constitution is predicated upon the “case or controversy”
requirement.49 Lacking a similar restriction, the Wyoming Constitution instead
gives the Wyoming Supreme Court jurisdiction over all “civil and criminal causes,”
thereby allowing a wider jurisdiction than that accorded in federal courts.50
Furthermore, most notably in cases where the Wyoming Supreme Court invoked
the public interest exception, the court has found a justiciable controversy in cases
that would not have met the federal standards.51 Indeed, the Wyoming legislature
mandates that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act “is to be liberally construed

courts to render advisory opinions or decide an artiﬁcial or academic controversy
without there being a palpable injury to be remedied. However, it is not a rigid or
dogmatic rule but one that must be applied with some view to realities as well as
practicalities. Standing should not be construed narrowly or restrictively.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 79 P.3d 500, 505 (Wyo. 2003); Jolley, 38
P.3d at 1076; Barber, 931 P.2d at 951; Declaratory Judgments, supra note 38, § 21.
46

Barber, 931 P.2d at 951; Rocky Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1167–68; Washakie County, 606 P.2d at

47

Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578.

317.
Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 527, 528 (1986).
48

49
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Keiter, supra note 48, at 529. The United States Supreme
Court elaborated upon the “case or controversy” requirement in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
“Article III requires, as an irreducible minimum, that a plaintiff allege (1) an injury that is (2) ‘fairly
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct’ and that is (3) ‘likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.’” 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
50
WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 2; Keiter, supra note 48, at 529, 533–34. Keiter argues there is
enough of a difference between the state and federal judicial systems to justify the State’s rejection
of the narrow constraints of the federal standing doctrine. Keiter, supra note 48, at 533–34.
51
Keiter, supra note 48, at 534. Compare Eastwood v. Wyo. Highway Dep’t., 301 P.2d 818,
819 (Wyo. 1956) (ﬁnding the plaintiff had standing under the public interest exception even
though the issue was moot), with Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (ﬁnding because
the issue was moot the plaintiff did not have standing).
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and administered.”52 Thus, the legislature’s provisions and the court’s recognition
of the public interest exception justify a liberal invocation of jurisdiction.53

The Brimmer Test
In assessing whether a Wyoming court has jurisdiction over an issue, courts use
a four-prong test ﬁrst articulated in Brimmer v. Thomson.54 According to Brimmer,
(1) the parties must have genuine rights at issue; (2) their controversy must be
redressable by the court; (3) the judgment must have the effect of a ﬁnal judgment
on the rights or, in the absence of these qualities, encompass a great public interest
and thereby stand in for the legal equivalent of all of them; and (4) the issue must
engender adversity.55 The Brimmer test encompasses the doctrines of standing,
ripeness, and mootness.56 It is relevant to note Wyoming case law regarding
justiciability reveals that, absent a matter of great public interest implicating the
third Brimmer element, litigants widely contest the ﬁrst two elements, while the
fourth has received relatively little attention.57

The First Brimmer Element
The ﬁrst Brimmer element requires the parties to “have existing and genuine,
as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests” at stake.58 In Ofﬁce of
State Lands & Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., the plaintiffs ﬁled a declaratory
judgment action claiming the Board of Land Commissioners’ consideration of
52

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-37-114; see also Rochelle, supra note 38, at 243.

53

Keiter, supra note 48, at 537; see, e.g., Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 318; Brimmer, 521 P.2d

at 574.
54
521 P.2d at 578; see Cox, 79 P.3d at 505 (quoting Reiman, 838 P.2d at 1186). This test is
originally from a Washington State case Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 496 P.2d 512, 517 (Wash.
1972).
55

521 P.2d at 578.

56

Barber, 931 P.2d at 951 (“The jurisprudential principles underlying the standing, ripeness,
and mootness doctrines are embodied in the deﬁnition of a justiciable controversy adopted in
Brimmer.”). The Brimmer elements and the doctrines they encompass tend to overlap, making it
difﬁcult to discuss the requirements and boundaries of one element without implicating another.
Rochelle, supra note 38, at 252.
57

See, e.g., Wilson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 153 P.3d 917, 926 (Wyo. 2007) (ﬁnding
while the plaintiffs had a “tangible interest” in the controversy when they received approval of their
subdivision, they lost it by not asserting their complaint regarding required open space when their
plan was initially approved, thereby failing to meet Brimmer elements one and two); Ofﬁce of State
Lands & Invs. v. Merbanco, Inc., 70 P.3d 241, 248–49 (Wyo. 2003) (ﬁnding while a non-proﬁt,
a county resident, and his children had standing to challenge the State’s obligation to sell public
school land at auction, a corporation did not because it did not have a legally recognizable right to
bid on the property, therefore failing to satisfy Brimmer element one); Dep’t of Revenue & Taxation
v. Paciﬁcorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1168–69 (Wyo. 1994) (ruling no tangible and legally protected
interest existed because the taxpayers only claimed they might apply for the contested exemption for
uncapitalized property, thereby failing to meet Brimmer element one).
58

Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578; Cox, 79 P.3d at 505 (quoting Reiman, 838 P.2d at 1186).
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an exchange of public school land for private land without a public auction was
unconstitutional.59 When the plaintiffs ﬁled the action, the Board had yet to
decide whether to forgo a public auction.60 Nevertheless, the Wyoming Supreme
Court found some of the plaintiffs had genuine rights at issue.61
Conversely, in White v. Board of Land Commissioners, the Board requested a
declaratory judgment on their own ruling that a lessee did not have a preferential
right to meet the highest bid in a public land auction.62 The Wyoming Supreme
Court found no justiciable controversy existed because the Whites’ rights were
only theoretical.63 The auction had not yet taken place, and the Board’s letter
indicated an intent to deny the Whites’ right at the auction—a future, rather than
existing, denial of a right.64 Most importantly, the Whites had not yet tried to
exercise their right nor was it ensured they would.65
Notably, in Merbanco, as opposed to White, while the damage had not yet
occurred, the court found the ﬁrst Brimmer element satisﬁed because the litigants’
rights—the county resident and his school-age children were stakeholders and
beneﬁciaries of funds generated by state school lands—were genuinely at issue
whether the auction occurred or not.66 Even if the Board denied the Whites the
59

70 P.3d at 244–45.

60

Id. at 246.

61

See id.

62

595 P.2d 76, 77 (Wyo. 1979).

63

Id. at 79–80; see also, e.g., Paciﬁcorp, 872 P.2d at 1168–69 (holding no tangible and legally
protected interest existed because the taxpayers only claimed they might apply for the contested
exemption for uncapitalized property); Mtn. W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hallmark Ins. Co.,
561 P.2d 706, 711–12 (Wyo. 1977) (ﬁnding because the plaintiff did not make the insurance policy
at issue a part of the record, their rights were only theoretical and therefore the controversy was not
justiciable); Budd v. Bishop, 543 P.2d 368, 372–73 (Wyo. 1975) (ﬁnding a water rights owner did
not have standing to challenge the State’s administration of the surplus water statute on behalf of
other water rights holders when he himself could not show an injury).
64

White, 595 P.2d at 79–80.

65

Id. at 80 (“It is altogether possible that the bid might be in excess of what the appellants
believe to be the value of the land, it might be beyond their resources, or they might simply lose
interest in buying this land.”).
66

Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 248. Regarding the use of a declaratory judgment action in situations
where the harm has not yet occurred but is almost certain to occur:
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act dispelled the myth that the judicial
arm of government could be extended only to redress prior wrongdoings (corrective
justice). The Act is founded upon the premise that society is disturbed not only
when legal rights are violated, but also when they are placed in serious doubt
or uncertainty. Consequently, the Act establishes a procedural vehicle whereby
litigants may approach the court for a declaration of their “rights, status, and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed” (preventative or
corrective justice).
Reiman, 838 P.2d at 1185 (citations omitted).
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opportunity to meet the highest bid, it was not certain their rights would have
been genuinely at issue because they might not have availed themselves of the
opportunity to meet the highest bid.67 Thus, the Whites’ theoretical rights did not
satisfy the ﬁrst Brimmer element while the Merbanco plaintiffs’ did.68

The Second Brimmer Element
The Brimmer test states, “The controversy must be one upon which the
judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or
argument evoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic
conclusion.”69 In Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, the Wyoming Supreme Court
clariﬁed “effectively operate.”70 Reiman sought to rescind a mistaken bid for a city
project; after the city accepted Reiman’s mistaken bid as the low bid, Reiman ﬁled
a declaratory judgment action seeking to either withdraw or reformulate the bid.71
Subsequent to the ﬁling, the city and Reiman agreed that if Reiman prevailed,
the city would pay the higher bid price, and if the city prevailed, it would pay
the lower amount.72 The district court held the issue was moot based on the
parties’ agreement; the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, stating, “‘[E]ffectively
operate’ means only that a court’s decision must have some practical effect upon the
litigants, i.e., a court may not issue a purely advisory opinion.”73 In Reiman, the
practical effect was that the ruling would determine which price the city paid.74
The second Brimmer element was also implicated in both White and
Merbanco. In White, the Board effectively asked for an advisory opinion regarding
the Board’s own ruling; however, because the Whites’ rights might never become
an issue, the court’s opinion would have been academic.75 In Merbanco, the court
held the county resident and his children had standing as stakeholders in the
educational system.76 However, the court noted while revenues from school lands
are devoted to the support of education, they provide a relatively small portion
of overall public school funding.77 Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not show how
67

White, 595 P.2d at 79–80.

68

Id.; Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 248.

69

Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578; Cox, 79 P.3d at 505 (quoting Reiman, 838 P.2d at 1186).

70

838 P.2d at 1187.

71

Id. at 1184–85.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 1187 (emphasis added); see also Beatty v. C.B. & Q.R. Co., 52 P.2d 404, 409 (Wyo.
1935); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 296 P. 206, 210 (Wyo. 1931).
74

838 P.2d at 1187.

75

595 P.2d at 79–80; see supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.

76

70 P.3d at 248; see also Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 316 (ﬁnding the plaintiffs had standing
even though they did not speciﬁcally cite the statutes causing their harm but referred to a “system”
of ﬁnancing public education); supra notes 58–61, 66–68 and accompanying text.
77

Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 248.
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a lack of increase in interest from the permanent school fund—where proceeds
from a public action would be deposited—would negatively impact the public
schools.78 Additionally, an exchange of school lands must be undertaken on a
value-for-value basis, and the court stated, “[I]t seems unlikely that an exchange
of lands would negatively impact the funds available for the support of education
in any signiﬁcant amount.”79 Nevertheless, the court found the county resident
and his children met the second Brimmer element.80 While the underlying goal of
the second Brimmer element is that the court expend its resources only on issues
adjudication can actually resolve, the distinction can be a narrow one.81
The second Brimmer element also encompasses the administrative remedies
consideration. The Wyoming Supreme Court ﬁrst articulated this consideration
in Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co.82 Individual water users sued a private
development company, arguing they had proportionate rights to stored water that
the permit-holding company refused to recognize.83 In this opinion the court
stated, “[A] declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally
serviceable remedy has been provided for the character of case in hand.”84 Almost
twenty-ﬁve years later, the court heard Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Association v.
State, in which the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment action invalidating
the rules promulgated by the Environmental Quality Council (EQC) to regulate
water produced by oil and gas companies.85 The court reiterated its Anderson
ﬁnding but then went on to reject it:

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id. In coming to its conclusion, the court relied on reasoning in Branson School Dist. RE-82
v. Romer, 958 F. Supp. 1501, 1509–11 (D. Colo. 1997) (ﬁnding the plaintiff school district and
public school students had standing even though the state legislature would likely make up any
shortfall from a decline in revenue caused by the challenged amendment, thereby negating the
plaintiffs’ injury), aff ’d, 161 F.3d 619, 631 (10th Cir. 1998) (declining to address whether plaintiffs
had standing based on a potential lack of revenue change but ﬁnding injury-in-fact in that the
trustees managed the lands not solely in the interest of supporting the public schools but taking
environmental and aesthetic considerations into their management strategy). Merbanco, 70 P.3d at
248; see infra notes 90–118 and accompanying text (discussing the public interest exception).
81
See Hirschﬁeld v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 944 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Wyo. 1997); Brimmer,
521 P.2d at 578. In Rocky Mtn., while the majority opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court held
the plaintiffs presented a justiciable controversy, the opinion itself does not reﬂect a discussion of the
Brimmer elements. See 645 P.2d at 1168. In his dissent, however, Justice Rose pointed out he failed
to ﬁnd where the plaintiffs had identiﬁed an application or probable future application of a rule that
would lead to an impingement of the plaintiffs’ rights resulting in a controversy the court’s decision
would redress. Id. at 1174 (Rose, J., dissenting).
82

154 P.2d at 348.

83

Id. at 347–48.

84

Id. at 348; see also Humane Soc’y v. Port, 404 P.2d 834, 835–36 (Wyo. 1965).

85

645 P.2d at 1164.
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In Wyoming, the existence of another adequate remedy will not,
of itself, preclude declaratory judgment relief. We cannot relegate
such relief to the position of an extraordinary, as opposed to an
optional, remedy.
Of course, there must be a justiciable controversy, and the
procedure cannot be used to secure an advisory opinion in a
matter in which there is no justiciable controversy.86
Furthermore, the Rocky Mountain court opined if the requested relief concerned
the validity of an agency regulation or the constitutionality of a statute granting
agency action, the court should hear the issue without requiring the exhaustion
of alternate remedies.87 As a result, the Rocky Mountain court found it within
the scope of the Declaratory Judgments Act to clarify whether the EQC had the
power to create rules and regulations controlling industrial waste, including water
produced by oil and gas companies.88 The court has subsequently applied the
Rocky Mountain parameters.89

The Third Brimmer Element & The Public Interest Exception
The Brimmer court stated the controversy must be one in which the
court’s decision will have the effect of a ﬁnal judgment regarding the law or a
legal relationship, or “wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding

86
Id. at 1167–68 (commenting on WYO. R. CIV. P. 57 which states, “The existence of
another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is
appropriate.”).
87

Id. at 1168; see also Hirschﬁeld, 944 P.2d at 1142.

88

645 P.2d at 1169. In his dissent, however, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Rose) stated
that a declaratory judgment should not have been available in this case because they did not exhaust
their administrative remedies, namely rulemaking proceedings according to Wyoming Statute
§ 9-4-106. Id. at 1175 (Rose & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Both Justice Rose and Justice Thomas
questioned the court’s ﬁnding of a justiciable controversy, arguing the plaintiffs’ rights were not
sure to be affected, nor was any action by the court sure to have any impact on the plaintiffs. Id.
at 1174; see also infra notes 183–89 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinions).
But see Goedert ex rel. Wolfe v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1225,
1228 (Wyo. 1999) (explaining the plaintiffs had the option of requesting rulemaking or instituting
a declaratory judgment action).
89
See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 150 P.3d 1216, 1221–23 (Wyo. 2007)
(holding Exxon was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because it challenged the
authority of the Board, not the results of the Board’s valuation method); Bonnie M. Quinn, 91
P.3d at 149 (holding the Trusts did not have standing to challenge a CBM operator’s lack of a
conditional use permit because they had not sought relief with the board administering the zoning
resolution and their complaint did not challenge the board’s authority to act); Mem’l Hosp., 770 P.2d
at 225–26 (holding administrative remedies need not be exhausted because the hospital’s complaint
questioned the constitutionality of statutory interpretation).
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public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them.”90 Further
articulating the public interest exception, the Brimmer court stated, “[T]here is
a well recognized exception that the rule requiring the existence of justiciable
controversies is not followed or is relaxed in matters of great public interest or
importance.”91 The third Brimmer element clearly states that if a matter of great
public interest is implicated in a case, it can stand in for the legal equivalent of
a justiciable controversy.92 Nevertheless, the exception must be employed with
caution.93
A year after Brimmer, the court stated in Cranston v. Thomson that in the
absence of the other Brimmer elements, an overriding public interest alone was
not enough to assert justiciability.94 However, the Brimmer version of the public
interest exception prevailed in several subsequent cases.95 Fifteen years after
Brimmer, in Memorial Hospital v. Department of Revenue & Taxation, the court
extended the exception from “a relaxation of the requirement for a justiciable
controversy to a justiﬁcation for standing,” stating:
Declaratory relief should be liberally administered if the elements
of a justiciable controversy exist to give the trial court jurisdiction.
For that controversy to exist, a genuine right or interest must be
at issue between adversarial parties, and the trial court must be
able to make an effective judgment which will ﬁnally determine
the rights of the parties. Even these prerequisites, however, may
properly be avoided or relaxed when matters of great public
interest or importance are presented to the trial court.96
90

521 P.2d at 578.

91

Id. Wyoming is not the only jurisdiction to recognize the public interest exception. See,
e.g., Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) (“We believe our doctrine of standing
in Iowa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury requirement could not be recognized for
citizens who seek to resolve certain questions of great public importance and interest in our system
of government.”); Berberian v. Travisono, 332 A.2d 121, 124 (R.I. 1975) (“[E]xcept for a relatively
few instances when compelling public interest makes for an exception to the rule, and actual
justiciable controversy . . . is basic to the court’s jurisdiction.”); State ex rel. Distilled Spirits Inst.,
Inc. v. Kinnear, 492 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Wash. 1972) (“Where the question is one of great public
interest and has been brought to the court’s attention . . . the court may exercise its discretion and
render a declaratory judgment to resolve a question of constitutional interpretation.”).
92

Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578.

93

Id.

94

530 P.2d at 729.

95

See, e.g., Mem’l Hosp., 770 P.2d at 226 (holding that, notwithstanding that the hospital had
ﬁled an administrative petition for review, a declaratory judgment action alleging the hospital’s taxexempt status precluded tax assessed on property purchased for its own use was available because the
hospital’s complaint questioned the constitutionality of statutory interpretation); Washakie County,
606 P.2d at 318.
96

770 P.2d at 226 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); cf. Jolley, 38 P.3d at 1077 (holding
a plaintiff challenging a change in the schedule of public meetings did not meet the justiciability
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Nine years later, in Management Council of the Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer,
the court considered whether the Management Council had standing to challenge
the Governor’s exercise of partial veto power under Article 4, § 9 of the Wyoming
Constitution.97 The court entirely dispensed with applying the Brimmer test,
stating the issue was one of great public importance, and therefore the court
recognized the standing of the Council to bring a declaratory judgment action.98
Following Brimmer, the Wyoming Supreme Court relaxed or dispensed
with analyzing requirements for a justiciable controversy in situations of
educational funding, the apportionment of state revenues, the constitutionality
of the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act, gubernatorial powers under the
Wyoming Constitution, and the constitutionality of a preferential right to renew
public land leases.99 Generally, these matters involved the constitutionality of
a statute or act.100 The court clariﬁed this distinction in Jolley v. State Loan &
Investment Board by declining to expand the exception to “encompass alleged
violations of an agency’s rules and regulations that do not directly implicate the
constitutionality of legislation or an agency’s actions or inactions.”101
Oftentimes, after determining the issue was of great public interest, the court
dispensed with applying the Brimmer test, ﬁnding the existence of a great public
interest gave the court jurisdiction over the matter.102 In other cases invoking the
public interest exception, the court discussed the Brimmer test and stated the

requirements, and those requirements would not be relaxed because the issue was not one of great
public importance).
97

953 P.2d 839, 840–42 (Wyo. 1998).

98

Id. at 842.

99

See id. (Governor’s partial veto power); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Laramie County Sch.
Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d 946, 950 (Wyo. 1994) (accumulated interest from school district funds);
Wyo. Ass’n of Consulting Eng’rs & Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826, 828–29 (Wyo. 1990)
(Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act); Mem’l Hosp., 770 P.2d at 227 (hospital’s tax exempt
status); Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 318 (educational funding ).
100

E.g., Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 318; cf. Jolley, 38 P.3d at 1078–79.

101

38 P.3d at 1078–79.

102

E.g., Geringer, 953 P.2d at 842 (following no discussion of the Brimmer test, the court
recognized jurisdiction over the plaintiffs because the issue was of great public importance); Laramie
County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d at 950 (following no mention of the Brimmer test, the court
stated the School District asserted a justiciable controversy because the issue was of great public
importance); Sullivan, 798 P.2d at 829 (“Without deciding whether Petitioners have standing . . . ,
we hold that the issue of whether the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act is constitutional is
of great public importance and, therefore, merits a decision from this Court.”); Sullivan, 798 P.2d
at 831 (Golden, J., specially concurring) (“I would also prefer that this court identify, explore, and
try to resolve certain concerns about ‘affected party’ principles and standing doctrine in Wyoming
jurisprudence. This appeal presents a unique opportunity for such an analysis, but we do not seize
it.”) (citations omitted).
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plaintiffs met all four elements.103 A number of these cases are worth a close look
because the court’s application of the Brimmer elements allowed wide latitude
regarding the manner in which the plaintiffs met the elements.104 For example,
the ﬁrst Brimmer element was noticeably relaxed in Washakie County School
District No. One v. Herschler, a case in which the appellants challenged Wyoming’s
system of ﬁnancing public education.105 In their briefs, the appellants asserted
the unconstitutionality of “the system of ﬁnancing public education” rather than
identifying a particular statute.106 The court found further speciﬁcity unnecessary
because in their pleadings the appellants had shown a complete understanding of
the statutes and how the statutes affected them.107 Consequently, the court was
willing to accept that the school district’s rights to an equitable system of public
education ﬁnancing were existing and genuine even given the lack of speciﬁcity in
pleading.108
The second element of the Brimmer test addresses whether the judgment
of the court will effectively operate on the situation at hand.109 The Washakie
County plaintiffs did not show how a new system of ﬁnancing would increase the
school district’s funds enough to impact the quality of education.110 As a result,
the plaintiffs’ argument that their damage was redressable by the court contained
several gaps the court was willing to overlook in order to assert the existence of a
justiciable controversy and ﬁnd the system of school ﬁnancing unconstitutional.111
Similarly, in Ofﬁce of State Lands & Investments v. Merbanco, the court
acknowledged the issue was of great public interest but only after concluding all
elements of a justiciable controversy existed.112 As discussed earlier in this note,
the Merbanco opinion clearly stretched the envelope of connectivity between
rights, injury, and resolution.113 Akin to Merbanco, the Wyoming Supreme Court’s
2003 ﬁnding of a justiciable controversy based on the public interest exception in

103
E.g., Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 249; Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 229–31 (Wyo. 2003);
Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 318.
104

The William West Ranch court acknowledged this leniency. 206 P.3d at 737.

105

606 P.2d at 316.

106

Id. (emphasis added).

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578; Cox, 79 P.3d at 505 (quoting Reiman, 838 P.2d at 1186).

110

See 606 P.2d at 316.

111

See id.; see also Keiter, supra note 48, at 535–36.

112

70 P.3d at 249; see also supra notes 58–61, 66–68, 75–81 and accompanying text.

113

70 P.3d at 249 (holding plaintiffs presented a justiciable controversy despite a lack of
evidence showing how funds from a public auction, as opposed to a proposed exchange of public
lands, would affect the quality of education in the district); see also supra notes 58–61, 66–68, 75–81
and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/5

16

Staehr: Civil Procedure - The Wyoming Supreme Court Constricts the Public

CASE NOTE

2010

157

Riedel v. Anderson was liberal in its application of the Brimmer test.114 The plaintiff
landowner challenged the constitutionality of the statute creating a preferential
right to renew public land leases, arguing that absent a competitive bid system,
the ﬁduciary violated its obligation to maximize revenue for the public school
system.115 The plaintiff claimed this violation resulted in diminished school funds,
which in turn translated into an injury to the public school system.116 The plaintiff
was not a beneﬁciary of the public school system nor did he articulate an alternate
injury; nonetheless, the court found injury “implicit in the relief he seeks, namely,
that the Board be enjoined from enforcing the preferential renewal statute and
that they be ordered to award the lease to him.”117 The court acknowledged this
stretch of the justiciability requirements by invoking the “great public interest
exception.”118

The Fourth Brimmer Element
Finally, the fourth element of the Brimmer test stipulates, “The proceedings
must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but
advanced with sufﬁcient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis
of the major issues.”119 In order to have genuine adversity, the parties must
have a tangible interest at stake that provokes more than mere disagreement.120
The situation in Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners illustrates
what constitutes genuine adversity for the Wyoming Supreme Court.121 Pedro/
Aspen, a land development corporation, brought a declaratory judgment action
challenging a Natrona County zoning ordinance.122 The county argued that
because the developer submitted an application under the ordinance “in the spirit
of cooperation” before challenging its validity, it did not hold a truly adverse
position.123 The court, however, found adversity, citing that because the developer
had withdrawn the application, the two parties’ positions were “diametrically
opposed” and held the plaintiff ’s attempt to meet the terms of the regulation did
not preclude it from later asserting its invalidity.124

114

See 70 P.3d at 230–31.

115

Id. at 230.

116

See id.

117

Id.

118

Id. at 231.

119

Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578; Cox, 79 P.3d at 505 (quoting Reiman, 838 P.2d at 1186).

120

See Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 94 P.3d 412, 417 (Wyo. 2004).

121

Id. at 413.

122

Id. at 419.

123

Id.

124

Id.
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PRINCIPAL CASE
The Wests and the Turners, Powder River Basin landowners, claimed
damage to their properties due to the inﬂux of CBM water into the local water
supply, leaking CBM reservoirs, and excessive CBM ground water pumping
in their area.125 In a declaratory judgment action at the district court level, the
landowners challenged the constitutionality of the Wyoming State Engineer’s
and the Wyoming Board of Control’s overall scheme in permitting CBM wells
and reservoirs.126 The district court dismissed their complaint, stating it did not
present a justiciable controversy.127 The landowners appealed this dismissal to
the Wyoming Supreme Court.128 In their argument, the Wests and the Turners
called upon the public interest exception to justiciability in declaratory judgment
actions, claiming the issue of groundwater drilling and disposal in an arid Western
state was of great public importance.129 The State countered by arguing the court
lacked jurisdiction because the landowners failed to establish any of the four
Brimmer elements and failed to exhaust administrative remedies.130

125

Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at ix; Brief of Pennaco, supra note 4, at 2.

126

William F. West Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tyrrell, 206 P.3d 722, 725 (Wyo. 2009). The landowners
asked the district court for several additional declarations on their behalf:
1.

The current permitting of CBM ground water and reservoirs violates
Wyoming’s statutes because it fails to quantify the amount of water put to
beneﬁcial use for CBM production.

2.

The [State Engineer’s] practice of permitting CBM ground water without
notice and an opportunity for a hearing violates the constitutional right to
due process of law under the United States and Wyoming constitutions.

3.

The State cannot issue permits for CBM ground water wells and reservoirs
without adopting rules pursuant to WAPA speciﬁcally addressing CBM
water and deﬁning the “public interest.”

4.

Placement of CBM water in reservoirs and pits for the purpose of achieving
disposal of that water through evaporation, inﬁltration and/or ﬂushing is not
a beneﬁcial use of water.

5.

The State must evaluate and weigh the public and various interests as part of
its duty to supervise Wyoming’s water.

6.

The State must inspect and adjudicate all CBM groundwater wells and
reservoirs used to store CBM water.

Id. at 732.
127

Id. at 725.

128

Id.

129

Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 6–22. The landowners alternatively argued they met all
four prongs of the Brimmer test. Id. at 9.
130

Brief of Appellees at 10–31, William West Ranch, 206 P.3d 722 (No. S-08-0161), 2008 WL
6559518.
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The Court’s Opinion
Justice Kite wrote the opinion for William West Ranch.131 The court focused
its jurisdictional discussion on whether the plaintiff landowners established a
justiciable controversy.132 Because Wyoming case law is well-settled regarding
declaratory judgment actions, the court limited its discussion to the court’s own
previous holdings.133 After generally deﬁning the scope of declaratory judgment
actions, the court invoked the Brimmer test and proceeded into a discussion
of case law providing guidance in applying the four elements.134 After noting
the plaintiffs’ allegations were “extensive” and “somewhat vague,” the court
consolidated them into four claims and applied the Brimmer test.135
The court found the ﬁrst Brimmer element, that of a tangible interest, satisﬁed
by the plaintiffs’ claim that they owned property damaged by CBM water.136 The

131

206 P.3d at 724. The court’s decision was unanimous. Id.

132

Id. at 725. The district court found the landowners failed to allege a justiciable controversy
but premised their holding on the fact that issues concerning the permitting and regulating of CBM
water were currently being deliberated by other branches of state government. Id.
133
Id. at 727 n.2. The State’s briefs relied on the federal case and controversy doctrine of
standing. Id. The court, however, rejected the federal argument and focused on Wyoming case law
regarding establishing a justiciable controversy in declaratory judgment actions, stating, however,
that Wyoming law is mostly consistent with federal law. Id. Keiter disagrees. Supra note 48, at
535–41.
134

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 726–29.

135

Id. at 729–36. The court summarized the plaintiffs’ allegations as follows:
1. The State has violated the Wyoming Constitution by failing to consider
the “public interest” and “all the various interests involved” when administering
CBM water. In addition, the plaintiffs allege generally that the State has violated
their right to due process. . . .
2. The State has violated Wyoming statutes in administering CBM water by
failing to protect the public interest in issuing CBM permits and to determine the
amount of water which may be withdrawn from groundwater wells and placed
in reservoirs in accordance with the concept of beneﬁcial use and prevention and
waste. West and Turner also claim that the State has abdicated its statutory duty to
adjudicate and inspect wells and reservoirs.
3. The State’s actions violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights. . . .
4. The State has violated the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act
(WAPA) governing agency rulemaking. Speciﬁcally, the plaintiffs claim the State
has failed to promulgate rules pertaining particularly to CBM well and reservoir
permitting and is, instead, unlawfully regulating by “policy” and “guidance” as
evidenced by the exhibits to the complaint.

Id. at 729–30 (citations and footnotes omitted). After holding the claims were “too amorphous
to be justiciable,” the court laid out what the plaintiffs needed to allege to establish a justiciable
controversy. Id. at 730–31.
136

Id. at 731.
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second element, however, the court found lacking, stating the plaintiffs failed to
speciﬁcally show how the relief they requested—that the court ﬁnd the State’s
regulatory actions regarding CBM water wells and reservoirs unconstitutional
and in violation of Wyoming statutes—would tangibly mitigate or prevent the
property damage they suffered.137
The court then addressed the exhaustion of administrative remedies
doctrine.138 Citing Rocky Mountain and Bonnie M. Quinn, the court stated
when the substance of the issue has been delegated to a speciﬁc agency and a
plaintiff challenges an agency action under its delegated authority, all available
administrative remedies must be exhausted; when a plaintiff challenges an agency’s
constitutional or statutory authority to act, however, administrative remedies need
not be exhausted before bringing a claim.139 Without speciﬁcally characterizing
each of the William West Ranch landowners’ claims, by holding the landowners
ought to have pursued administrative remedies before bringing their suit, the
court implied they challenged the State Engineer’s and Board of Control’s actions
under their delegated authority.140
In addressing the Wests’ and the Turners’ invocation of the public interest
exception, the court agreed the issue was one of great public interest.141
Summarizing precedential usage of the exception, the court characterized it as
conﬁned to instances presenting a constitutional question or issue regarding the
apportionment of State funds.142 Then the court reiterated an early holding, that
of Cranston v. Thomson in 1975, in which it stated even in cases concerning the

137
Id. at 731–32. See also supra note 126 and accompanying text for the speciﬁc declarations
the plaintiffs asked the court to make. In summing up its position, the court took its previous
declaratory judgment rulings a step further by stating the plaintiffs had a “duty to allege sufﬁcient
speciﬁc facts showing that a judgment in their favor will have an immediate and real effect on
them.” William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 733 (emphasis added). The court noted that by “failing
to challenge a particular permit, the plaintiffs have not provided a context in which a court could
determine” the nature of the agency’s action. Id. Additionally, the court cited Budd v. Bishop, 543
P.2d 368, 372 (Wyo. 1975) (ﬁnding a water rights owner did not have standing to challenge the
State’s administration of the surplus water statute on behalf of other water rights holders when he
himself could not show any injury), stating that parties cannot ask for a declaratory judgment on
behalf of other injured parties. William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 733.
138

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 735.

139

Id.

140

Id. at 735–36. The court mentioned several potentially available administrative remedies
including: (1) petitioning the State Engineer to conduct rulemaking pursuant to Wyoming Statute
§ 16-3-106; (2) ﬁling a well interference action pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 41-3-911; (3)
petitioning the Board of Control for a determination of the amount of water a CBM producer
is entitled to withdraw; and (4) petitioning the district court to review a speciﬁc agency action
pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 16-3-114. William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 735–36.
141

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 736–37.

142

Id. at 737.
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public interest, a justiciable controversy must be at the heart of the issue for it
to be heard.143 In holding it did not have jurisdiction over the action brought by
the Wests and the Turners, the court stated that while it has recognized a “more
lenient deﬁnition of justiciability” in cases of great public importance, all four
Brimmer elements must nonetheless be met to establish justiciability.144

ANALYSIS
In William F. West Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tyrrell, the Wyoming Supreme Court
asserted that to establish a justiciable controversy and invoke the court’s
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs had a duty to speciﬁcally show how the court’s action
would remedy their particular harm.145 This decision narrows the footing upon
which a declaratory judgment can be brought to only those plaintiffs who can
unequivocally show how the declaration of a right—even one in the public
interest—would directly and tangibly beneﬁt them.146 Additionally, the court’s
holding that all four Brimmer elements must be met even in situations of great
public interest negates the public interest exception’s role as a legal stand-in for a
justiciable controversy.147 This section tracks the court’s exploration of the second
Brimmer element as it applied to the plaintiff landowners’ claims, beginning with
the court’s holding that the plaintiffs ought to have exhausted administrative
143

Id.; see also Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 728–29 (Wyo. 1975).

144

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 732–33, 736–37. As examples, the court cited Washakie
County, Memorial Hospital, and Merbanco, stating that in none of these intervening public interest
cases had they detoured from Cranston. Id. at 737. Along the way to this holding, the court articulated
how future litigants in CBM water cases might avoid the pitfalls it identiﬁed in the Wests’ and the
Turners’ pleadings. Id. at 722–28. As alternatives to declaratory judgment actions, the court noted
the plaintiff landowners might have been able to bring a civil action to ﬁnd relief from continuing
property damage. Id. at 735 n.12. Negligence, nuisance, and trespass actions have been brought
against individual CBM producers for damage to property based on the producer’s disposal of CBM
wastewater. Id. However, while these alternatives might solve one issue of property damage on one
piece of property, they would not do what the Wests and the Turners set out to do—effect a changed
State system of regulation and permitting procedures that more equally balances the many interests
at stake in accord with the agency’s constitutional and statutory duties. See Brief of Appellants,
supra note 2, at 2–3. Furthermore, it is possible that civil claims against the CBM producers were
unavailable to the Wests and the Turners. Brief of Pennaco, supra note 4, at 6. Appellees Pennaco
Energy Inc. and Devon Energy Production Company, L.P., stated:
On February 14, 2002, . . . the Wests entered into a Surface Damage and
Access Agreement . . . with Devon whereby they agreed to accept payment of
a substantial annual fee for Devons’ [sic] discharge and management of CBNG
water on their ranch. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the Wests further
agreed that the payments they received from Devon were full and complete
satisfaction for any damages caused by the discharge and management of CBNG
water.
Id. (citations omitted).
145

206 P.3d 722, 733 (Wyo. 2009).

146

See infra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.

147

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 737; see also infra notes 193–218 and accompanying text.
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remedies.148 Next, this analysis takes a close look at how the court characterized
the plaintiffs’ claims in relation to the requirements of the second Brimmer
element.149 The leniency with which Wyoming Supreme Court precedent applied
the Brimmer test suggested a wider latitude for establishing a justiciable controversy
than the court adopted in William West Ranch.150 Consequently, the William West
Ranch decision raised the bar for plaintiffs attempting to establish justiciability.151
Finally, this note examines the court’s discussion of the public interest exception
in precedential case law and its application in William West Ranch.152 The court’s
invalidation of the exception nulliﬁed the doctrine’s jurisdiction-granting
function.153

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In William West Ranch, the court acknowledged its holdings in Rocky Mountain
and Bonnie M. Quinn, both of which distinguished between cases challenging a
particular action of an agency and those challenging the agency’s statutory or
constitutional authority to act.154 When a particular agency action is challenged,
148

See infra notes 154–73 and accompanying text.

149

See infra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.

150

See infra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.

151

See Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 317 (Wyo. 1980)
(“[I]t is not a rigid or dogmatic rule but one that must be applied with some view to realities as well
as practicalities. Standing should not be construed narrowly or restrictively.”); see also infra notes
174–92 and accompanying text.
152

See infra notes 193–218 and accompanying text; Keiter, supra note 48, at 536–37. Keiter

writes:
The Wyoming Supreme Court has . . . broadly construed the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act and sanctioned actions under it that raised questions of great
public importance.
....
. . . [T]he court has held that parties seeking relief under the Act must
present a justiciable controversy in an adversarial posture; however, the court also
has read an “issue of great public importance” exception into these justiciability
requirements.
Keiter, supra note 48, at 536–37; see also Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 317; Brimmer v. Thomson,
521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974).
153
See Keiter, supra note 48, at 540 (“[T]he ‘affected party’ principle cannot be understood as
an absolute standing barrier because the court has recognized the ‘matter of great public importance’
exception.”). Keiter’s “affected party” terminology is drawn from Wyoming case law; he explains
that it reﬂects the court’s concern with avoiding premature judicial resolution of constitutional
issues but should not be restricted by the federal three-part injury-in-fact test for standing. Id.
at 539; see also Ofﬁce of State Lands & Invs. v. Merbanco, Inc., 70 P.3d 241, 249 (Wyo. 2003);
Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578.
154
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 735; see, e.g., Bonnie M. Quinn Revocable Trust v. SRW,
Inc., 91 P.3d 146, 151 (Wyo. 2004); Rocky Mtn. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1168–69
(Wyo. 1982). See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difference
between the types of challenges.
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plaintiffs must ﬁrst exhaust alternative remedies; when the agency’s constitutional
or statutory authority to act is challenged, alternative administrative remedies
need not be exhausted.155
The court identiﬁed several of the landowners’ claims as challenging the State’s
constitutional and statutory authority to act.156 For example, the landowners
asked for a declaration that the State’s regulatory scheme for CBM water violated
its statutory authority by disregarding the public welfare.157 Speciﬁcally, the
landowners argued that since the State’s regulatory scheme does not control the
amount of water which may be withdrawn by CBM producers “in accordance
with the concepts of beneﬁcial use and prevention of waste,” the State has violated
its afﬁrmative duty to guard the public welfare.158 In support of their claim, the
landowners cited several Wyoming statutes including § 41-3-909(a), which
outlines the policy of the State regarding the conservation of underground water
resources and charges the State Engineer and Board of Control with requiring that
wells be constructed and maintained to prevent waste of underground water.159
155

Bonnie M. Quinn, 91 P.3d at 151 (holding the plaintiffs must exhaust administrative
remedies because their request for a declaratory judgment regarding whether the production of
CBM requires a conditional use permit according to a zoning resolution was not a constitutional
challenge); Rocky Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1168–69 (holding the plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative
remedies because their request for a declaratory judgment challenged the EQC’s regulatory scheme
as in violation of its statutory authority).
156

See William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 731–34; Reply Brief of Appellants at 7, William West
Ranch, 206 P.3d 722 (No. S-08-0161), 2008 WL 5041673. See supra note 135 and accompanying text
listing the court’s restatement of the plaintiffs’ claims. The landowners’ complaints were admittedly
general, as the court and the State concluded; nevertheless, they were couched as challenges to
the agencies’ statutory and constitutional authority to act. Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at vi,
15–16; Reply Brief of Appellants, supra, at 6–7 (“The relief sought by Appellants . . . concerns the
constitutionality of agency practices . . . and thus falls squarely into the Merbanco category of cases,
in which the Wyoming Supreme Court has found that judicial review is necessary regardless of the
availability of administrative remedies.”). Additionally, the district court classiﬁed the landowners’
complaints as challenging the “constitutionality of the current CBM water permitting scheme.”
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 11 n.2. But see Brief of Appellees, supra note 130, at 8–9
(“They did not ask the district court to declare illegal any particular actions or inactions by the State
Engineer or Board of Control either in their respective drainages or which relate to their particular
properties.”).
157
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 732; see WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 3; WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-3-931, 41-4-503 (2009); see also Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 244; Rocky Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1168–69.
158
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 729–30; see Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 16–17.
These allegations are analogous to prior challenges of constitutional or statutory authority. See, e.g.,
Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 244 (challenging the decision of the Ofﬁce of State Lands & Investments and
the Board of Land Commissioners to exchange school lands without public auction as in violation
of the state constitution); Rocky Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1165, 1168–69 (challenging the EQC’s regulatory
scheme as in violation of its statutory authority).
159
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 729–30; see Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 14–17.
Additionally, the landowners state:

Just as in Merbanco and Brimmer, the Wests and Turners seek a judicial
determination of the constitutional propriety of the State Engineer’s practice
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The landowners focused their argument on the overall CBM water regulatory
scheme and its unconstitutional nature; however, the court repeatedly noted the
plaintiffs should have made allegations regarding speciﬁc permits, speciﬁc wells,
and speciﬁc State actions.160 The court recognized the State’s duty to consider the
public interest under the cited statutes but asserted that a declaration regarding that
duty would not have a practical effect on the plaintiff landowners.161 Effectively,
the court disregarded the landowners’ challenges to the statutory authority of
the agency’s regulatory stance based on the standing doctrine without addressing
whether they were barred by the alternative remedies doctrine.162 This treatment
suggests the alternative remedies doctrine does not apply to a number of the
landowners’ claims.163
Without identifying which claims it referenced, the court went on to imply
some of the plaintiffs’ claims challenged the State’s action in granting permits,
which, according to Rocky Mountain, requires the exhaustion of alternate
remedies.164 The court’s contradictory characterizations of the landowners’ various

of issuing permits without consideration of the public interest, as required by
Wyoming Constitution art. 8, § 3; without equally guarding the various interests
involved, as required by Wyoming Constitution art. 1, § 31 . . . .
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 14; see WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 31 (“Water being essential to
industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its control
must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests
involved.”); WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 3 (“Priority of appropriation for beneﬁcial use shall give the
better right. No appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public
interests.”).
160

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 730–34. It is difﬁcult to reconcile the court’s and the
State’s insistence that the landowners challenge a particular action of the State when the State’s
current regulatory stance is general inaction regarding the quantity of produced CBM water, the
adjudication of reservoirs that double as stock ponds, and the depletion of groundwater resources.
GUIDANCE: CBM/GROUND WATER PERMITS, supra note 5, passim (explaining the State Engineer is
required to grant applications for permits to drill wells for the production of CBM “as a matter
of course” because it is for a “beneﬁcial use.”). See generally Herlihy, supra note 31 (arguing limits
should be placed on the quantity of water produced by the CBM industry to ensure compliance
with the public interest statutory requirement and the wise use of both resources).
161

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 732–33; see supra notes 69–81 and accompanying text
(discussing the second Brimmer element and the court’s ability to address injured rights).
162

See William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 733–35. “Declaratory relief decrees under Wyoming’s
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act are intended to terminate uncertainty and provide relief from
insecurity with respect to one’s rights; prevent wrongs before their commission; stabilize uncertain
or disputed legal relations; and generally declare rights, status, or other legal relations.” Rochelle,
supra note 38, at 243.
163
See William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 733–35; Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 247; Rocky Mtn., 645
P.2d at 1168–69.
164
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 735; see also Bonnie M. Quinn, 91 P.3d at 151; Humane
Soc’y v. Port, 404 P.2d 834, 835 (Wyo. 1965). The court stated, “[W]hen the matter at issue is
one that has been delegated to an administrative agency, such as whether to grant a permit, the
challenger must utilize available administrative processes.” William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 735.
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declaratory requests muddied the court’s argument, making it difﬁcult to parse
which declarations the court felt challenged the State’s constitutional and statutory
authority to act and which did not.165 The only claim the court conclusively
addressed was the plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment ordering the State
to adopt new regulations.166 The court stated the landowners should have ﬁrst
requested rulemaking under Wyoming Statute § 16-3-106.167 Regarding the
court’s handling of this request, however, there is contrary precedent suggesting
that a declaratory judgment action was still within the purview of the plaintiffs.168
In William West Ranch, the distinction between the two types of claims comes
down to scope and semantics.169 The plaintiffs based their allegations on the
unconstitutional nature of the general scheme of regulation currently in place.170
While the court’s stance was slightly unclear, it repeatedly focused on speciﬁc
actions of the State, consistently dismissing the landowners’ broader arguments.171
However, had the court clearly found no constitutional or statutory challenge,
it could have stopped its analysis there, forgoing any discussion of the standing
doctrine.172 The court’s holding regarding the exhaustion of alternate remedies
was not in error; it was simply not speciﬁc as to which claims it applied.173

Perhaps the court referred to separate declaratory judgment requests than those discussed previously
in its analysis; perhaps it meant to recharacterize the previously discussed claims. See id.
165

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 730–35.

166

Id.

167

Id. at 736. Any interested person may petition the State Engineer to conduct rulemaking.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-106 (2009).
168

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 730–35. In its discussion, the court speciﬁcally referenced
Goedert ex rel. Wolfe v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 1225,
1228 (Wyo. 1999), as illustrative of the importance of rulemaking. Id. at 736. While the Goedert
court held the plaintiff should have requested rulemaking, it acknowledged that, alternatively, the
plaintiff “could have challenged the rules by instituting an independent action for a declaratory
judgment.” 991 P.2d at 1228. The Goedert court stated seeking rulemaking and initiating a
declaratory judgment action were equally viable, independent options. See id. The Wests and
the Turners opted for a declaratory judgment. See William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 735; Brief of
Appellants, supra note 2, at 4–8.
169

Compare William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 733–35 (insisting landowners allege harm from
speciﬁc wells and permits), with Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 156, at 6–7 (alleging the
State’s overall scheme of CBM water regulation did not comply with statutory and constitutional
mandates).
170

Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 156, at 6–7.

171

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 733–35.

172

See Bonnie M. Quinn, 91 P.3d at 151; Humane Soc’y, 404 P.2d at 835; see also supra notes
82–89 and accompanying text.
173

See William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 733–35.
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Speciﬁcity of Evidence Needed to Establish the Brimmer Elements
In criticizing how the plaintiff landowners argued their issue, the court stated
to meet the second Brimmer element, the plaintiffs should have alleged (1) the
State had a constitutional duty to execute a particular function in regulating CBM
water; (2) the State failed to do so with respect to particular CBM producers;
(3) this failure caused actual damage to their properties; and (4) the State must
take some regulatory action that will effectively redress their grievances.174
Furthermore, the parties should have challenged a particular permit or the lack of
adjudication of particular wells and reservoirs affecting their land and identiﬁed
speciﬁc reservoirs that leaked, leading to the damage they claimed.175 Overall,
the court asked for a very speciﬁc line of evidence from the actions of the State
to the landowners’ impinged-upon rights and, from there, to an established
assuredness the court’s ruling would have an effect on the plaintiffs.176 This
approach appears closer to the federal three-prong test for injury-in-fact than to
the requirements of the Brimmer test.177 Furthermore, the Wests and the Turners
were not challenging a particular State action but the entire regulatory CBM
water scheme as an unconstitutional interpretation of the agency’s authority.178
This wide, and arguably vague, focus in the landowners’ pleadings led to exactly
the lack of speciﬁcity the court criticized.179 However, in precedential cases the
court found the plaintiffs met the Brimmer test even when the pleadings exhibited
similar gaps and lacked speciﬁcity.180
In Rocky Mountain, a case that did not implicate a great public interest, the
court held the plaintiffs asserted a justiciable controversy in bringing a declaratory
judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the rules and regulations of
the Environmental Quality Council (EQC).181 Because the EQC’s regulations
174

Id. at 730–31.

175

Id. at 734.

176

Id.; see also Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578–79. For further discussion of Brimmer elements one
and two, see supra notes 58–81.
177
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992); supra notes 49–53 and
accompanying text (discussing the federal three-prong test); Keiter, supra note 48, at 533–34, 539
(commenting there is enough of a difference between the state and federal judicial systems to justify
the State’s rejection of the narrow constraints of the federal standing doctrine).
178

See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the landowners’
allegations).
179

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 729–31; Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 18–23.

180

See, e.g., Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 249 (failing to show how the plaintiffs would be affected
by a lack of increase in interest from the school fund or how the court’s action would have any
tangible effect on them); Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 316 (failing to speciﬁcally cite the statutes
with which the plaintiffs took issue or how the court’s action would have any tangible effect on the
plaintiffs); see also Keiter, supra note 48, at 537; supra notes 58–81 (discussing cases in which the
court overlooked gaps and vague pleadings to ﬁnd standing).
181

645 P.2d at 1168.
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required the plaintiffs’ immediate action to secure permits which could require
considerable time and expense, as well as penalties if they did not succeed, the
court found the Brimmer test met.182 In dissenting, however, Justices Rose and
Thomas argued the majority was too liberal in ﬁnding a justiciable controversy.183
Justice Rose explained the plaintiffs ought to have pointed to an “actual threatened
application of a rule together with a probable adverse effect.”184 He went on to
posit, “For all we know, DEQ might never invoke the rule against the appellants,
or, if it did, the appellants might ﬁnd it impossible to show they were harmed in
such a degree as a court would ﬁnd sufﬁcient to call for declaratory relief.”185 Justice
Thomas stated the plaintiffs premised their claim on their own interpretation of
the agency rules, which could arguably be interpreted and applied in an alternate
way.186 In sum, both Justices argued the presence of Brimmer elements one and two
was ambiguous.187 Nevertheless, the majority found a threatened right sufﬁciently
connected to the agency’s regulation which was redressable by the court.188
The dissenting opinions in Rocky Mountain articulated several arguments used
by the William West Ranch court in ﬁnding the landowners had not presented a
justiciable controversy.189 However, it is the majority opinion in Rocky Mountain
that stands as precedent, and it is indeed the majority’s ﬁnding of a justiciable
controversy in Rocky Mountain that the William West Ranch court cited.190 The
dissent’s characterization of the nebulous quality of the Rocky Mountain plaintiffs’
affected right and the lack of certainty regarding the court’s ability to mitigate
the issue highlights a precedential degree of leniency regarding Brimmer elements
one and two, even when the public interest exception was not implicated.191 In
182

Id.

183

Id. at 1174–75 (Rose, J., dissenting); id. at 1175 (Thomas & Rose, JJ., dissenting).

184

Id. at 1174 (Rose, J., dissenting).

185

Id.

186

Id. at 1175 (Thomas & Rose, JJ., dissenting).

187

See id. at 1174–75 (Rose, J., dissenting); id. at 1175 (Thomas & Rose, JJ., dissenting).
Brimmer element one requires an impinged-upon present or future right. See supra notes 58–68.
The possibility that the agency might never invoke the rule against the plaintiff, that the plaintiff
might not be able to show actual harm by having to comply with the rule, or that the rule might be
interpreted so as to not implicate the plaintiff at all pulled the ﬁrst Brimmer element into question.
Rocky Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1174–75 (Rose, J., dissenting). The second Brimmer element requires the
court’s decision to effectively remedy the harm. See supra notes 69–81. If the harm was not certain to
occur, it was possible the court’s action would have no tangible effect on the plaintiffs. Rocky Mtn.,
645 P.2d at 1174–75 (Rose, J., dissenting).
188

Rocky Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1168.

189

See William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 730–35; Rocky Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1174–75 (Rose, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1175 (Thomas & Rose, JJ., dissenting); supra notes 131–44 and accompanying
text (discussing the principal case).
190

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 728.

191

See Rocky Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1174–75 (Rose, J., dissenting); see also Keiter, supra note 48, at

535–36.
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William West Ranch, however, under the purported relaxed standards of the public
interest exception, the court was not willing to ﬁnd a justiciable controversy in
light of similar doubts as to the court’s ability to redress the harm.192

The Court’s Negation of the Public Interest Exception
The court was unwilling to ﬁnd that the William West Ranch plaintiffs met
the requirements of the second Brimmer element.193 It was, however, willing to
accept the landowners’ assertion that the case presented a matter of great public
importance.194 In its discussion, the court stated that throughout precedential case
law applying the public interest exception, all four elements of the Brimmer test
were met.195 Such is not the case.
In Merbanco, a case implicating a great public interest, the court found all
four prongs of the Brimmer test met in a situation presenting as many gaps as
that in Rocky Mountain.196 A county resident and his children claimed the school
system would be detrimentally affected if the Board of Land Commissioners
traded school lands in a value-for-value exchange instead of putting them up for
auction.197 The court conceded the plaintiffs failed to show how additional interest
deposited in the school fund from a public auction would have any effect on the
educational system.198 Nor did the plaintiffs show how their rights as stakeholders
in that system would be negatively impacted.199 The court instead focused on the
impact funds from an auction would have on the balance of the permanent school
fund itself, found the impact signiﬁcant, and therefore concluded the plaintiffs
had standing.200

192
See Rochelle, supra note 38, at 267 (“What constitutes a justiciable controversy will not
always be clear. In the past, the Wyoming Supreme Court has involved itself in the splitting of hairs
when it comes to distinguishing a justiciable controversy from a nonjusticiable one.”). See supra notes
126, 135, 144, and 156 for a discussion of the vague nature of the landowners’ allegations in relation
to the second element of the Brimmer test. See, e.g., Humane Soc’y, 404 P.2d at 835 (refusing to grant
declaratory relief because the plaintiff did not plead concrete facts). But see Rochelle, supra note 38,
at 256–57 (arguing the court’s ﬁnding in Humane Society was erroneous because declaratory relief is
to be liberally administered).
193

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 731–32.

194

Id. at 736. Additionally, the State Engineer and Board of Control conceded the issue
presented a matter of great public importance. Brief of Appellees, supra note 130, at 28.
195

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 737.

196

Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 246–49 (stating the plaintiffs met the four Brimmer elements even
though the court invoked the public interest exception).
197

Id. at 248.

198

Id.

199

Id. at 248–49.

200

Id.
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The Wests and the Turners were in an analogous situation as stakeholders in
a scheme of interests including landowners, sub-surface mineral rights holders,
CBM producers, water rights holders, etc., affected by the State’s regulation of
CBM water.201 Unlike the plaintiffs in Merbanco, they showed not just that they
were stakeholders, but that their rights had been tangibly invaded.202 The Wests
and the Turners asked for a ruling that the State’s regulation and permitting
of CBM water wells and reservoirs was unconstitutional, just as the Merbanco
plaintiffs asked for a ruling that not offering school lands at a public auction
was unconstitutional.203 In neither case was it certain such a ruling would redress
the problem.204 In Merbanco, no actual problem was identiﬁed; nevertheless, as
stakeholders, the court considered the plaintiffs’ rights at issue; furthermore, the
chance the requested ruling would have any effect at all on the plaintiffs was
miniscule.205 In William West Ranch, there was similarly no guarantee, though
certainly a chance, that a new regulatory/permitting scheme would mitigate the
landowners’ property damage.206 In both cases, however, ﬁnding the contested

201

See Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 16–17; RUCKELSHAUS REPORT, supra note 23, at

v–ix.
202
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 731; Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at ix; see infra notes
66–68 and accompanying text (discussing how, in a declaratory judgment action, the damage need
not have already occurred as long as it is substantially certain to occur).

In Merbanco, the court recognized the plaintiffs’ interest in the value of the permanent
school fund as their affected right even though no tangible beneﬁt or detriment would accrue to
the plaintiffs. 70 P.3d at 248. The value of the school lands added to the value of the permanent
school fund in a value-for-value exchange was equal to the value of the school fund if the land was
auctioned. Id. This suggests the issue was moot. See Eastwood v. Wyo. Highway Dept., 301 P.2d
818, 819 (Wyo. 1956) (holding even though the period of revocation had expired and the issue
was therefore moot, the plaintiff could challenge the revocation of his driver’s license because the
court considered the issue to be of great public interest). Nevertheless, the Merbanco court found a
justiciable controversy. 70 P.3d at 248–49.
203
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 729–30. The Merbanco plaintiffs challenged a much more
speciﬁc action of the State than did the landowners in William West Ranch. Compare William West
Ranch, 206 P.3d at 729–30, with Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 248–49. However, the landowners in William
West Ranch listed the statutes and acts they challenged. 206 P.3d at 729–30. For an example of a case
in which the court waived the need for speciﬁcity in challenging a particular statute, see Washakie
County, 606 P.2d at 316 (ﬁnding the plaintiffs asserted a justiciable controversy even though they
did not speciﬁcally cite the statutes allegedly causing their harm, instead referring to a “system” of
ﬁnancing public education).
204
William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 732; Merbanco, 70 P.3d at 248–51. See supra notes 162–73
for a discussion of the court’s rationale in Rocky Mountain regarding the existence of arguably
unaffected rights that would not be redressable by the court’s action.
205

70 P.3d at 248–49.

206

206 P.3d at 731; Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 21–22. The landowners did not claim
a judicial ﬁnding that the actions or lack thereof on the part of the State would speciﬁcally redress
their damage, rather they argued the Reiman court’s articulation of “effectively operate” applied.
Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 21–22. According to the Reiman court, “effectively operate”
means the court’s opinion must have some practical effect on the litigants. 838 P.2d 1182, 1187
(Wyo. 1992); see also supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text (discussing the second Brimmer
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actions unconstitutional would affect the stakeholders—groups to which the
plaintiffs, in each case, belonged.
The court’s granting of standing to the Merbanco plaintiffs can only be
understood in light of the leniency afforded by the public interest exception; it
follows that the same leniency should have been applied in William West Ranch.207
The Merbanco court showed particular leniency in ﬁnding the plaintiffs satisﬁed
the Brimmer test.208 The Wyoming Supreme Court acted with similar leniency
in regard to the Brimmer elements in cases discussed throughout this note, both
those that did and did not implicate a great public interest.209 In Washakie County,
for example, the plaintiffs established a justiciable controversy even though they
did not speciﬁcally cite the statutes causing their harm but referred to a “system”
of ﬁnancing public education.210 Similarly, the Riedel court found the plaintiff
asserted a justiciable controversy by claiming the ﬁduciary for public school lands
failed to maximize revenue for the public schools, even though the plaintiff was
not a beneﬁciary of the school system and did not articulate an alternate injury.211

element). Practically, having the permanent school fund increase by $36.48 million would have had
no effect on the Merbanco plaintiffs. See 70 P.3d at 248. As stakeholders in the system, the court
explained, the balance of the permanent school fund was relevant to the plaintiffs. See id. Similarly,
while a ruling that the State acted unconstitutionally in permitting CBM wells would result in new
regulations that might affect the Wests and the Turners, it is likely that they, like the Merbanco
plaintiffs, would be unaffected in a practical way. Brief of Appellees, supra note 130, at 21, 30.
However, as Powder River Basin landowners, a new set of regulations purportedly taking the public
interest into account would be as relevant to the Wests and the Turners as a $36.48 million increase
in the permanent school fund was to the Merbanco plaintiffs. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 2,
at 22.
207

See Keiter, supra note 48, at 537–38. Regarding the public interest exception:
[T]he Act represents a legislative determination that the doors of the State’s courts
should be opened widely to hear such actions . . . . Thus, the court is justiﬁed in
liberally according standing under the Act as it has in cases such as Brimmer v.
Thompson [sic] and Washakie County School District No. 1 v. Herschler. . . .
. . . The cases [Brimmer and Washakie County] point towards a liberal
construction of the state constitutional standing provisions.

Id.
208

See id.; supra notes 58–81 and accompanying text (discussing how Merbanco stretched the
boundaries of the Brimmer elements).
209

See Keiter, supra note 48, at 537–38; Rochelle, supra note 38, at 251–52; see, e.g., Rocky
Mtn., 645 P.2d at 1174–75 (Rose & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 316;
Brimmer, 521 P.2d 574.
210

606 P.2d at 316.

211

70 P.3d at 230.
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In acknowledging the relaxed justiciability requirements previously afforded
by the public interest exception, the William West Ranch court asserted that,
leniency aside, all four elements of the Brimmer test had been met in precedential
cases.212 This argument is akin to saying the chicken came ﬁrst, not the egg—the
court found the Brimmer elements met, but the elements were only met because
of the leniency with which the court established standing in cases involving a
great public interest.213 Absent a great public interest, the court arguably might
have found these same elements lacking.214
While it lies within the court’s discretion to read ﬂexibility into the
four Brimmer elements in any given case, its holdings set the tone for future
litigation.215 In this case, while it was within the court’s discretion to ﬁnd that
the parties did not present a justiciable controversy, the court did so based on
reasoning that directly contradicted its own past decisions.216 Consequently, as
William West Ranch now stands as precedent, the court has restricted cases which
can be brought under a declaratory judgment action by requiring a more speciﬁc
link between the plaintiffs’ damages and the court’s ability to provide a tangible
remedy.217 Additionally, the court has withdrawn the public interest exception
from the justiciability doctrine, likewise limiting the cases which can be brought
implicating a great public interest but standing on shaky justiciability legs.218

CONCLUSION
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in William West Ranch narrowed
the basis upon which a declaratory judgment action can be brought to only those
plaintiffs who can show how their speciﬁc remedy will be directly and tangibly

212

William West Ranch, 206 P.3d at 737.

213

See, e.g., Mgmt. Council of the Wyo. Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo.
1998); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d 946, 950 (Wyo.
1994); Wyo. Ass’n of Consulting Eng’rs & Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826, 828–29 (Wyo.
1990); Mem’l Hosp. of Laramie County v. Dep’t of Revenue & Taxation, 770 P.2d 223, 227 (Wyo.
1989); Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 318.
214
See, e.g., Geringer, 953 P.2d at 843; Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. One, 884 P.2d at 949–50;
Sullivan, 798 P.2d at 828–29; Mem’l Hosp., 770 P.2d at 227; Washakie County, 606 P.2d at 318;
supra notes 82–111 and accompanying text.
215

See Mem’l Hosp., 770 P.2d at 226; Keiter, supra note 48, at 527–28; Rochelle, supra note 38,

at 267.
216

See supra notes 174–214 and accompanying text.

217

See supra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.

218

See supra notes 193–214 and accompanying text.
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redressed by the court’s actions.219 Additionally, the court restricted the relaxed
nature of justiciability in cases implicating a great public interest by holding all
four elements of the Brimmer test must be met even when plaintiffs invoke the
exception.220 This decision is inconsistent with past cases—both those that did
and did not involve a great public interest—in which the court found a justiciable
controversy even when pleadings lacked speciﬁcity and exhibited gaps similar to
those in William West Ranch.221 With the requirements to establish a justiciable
controversy as well as the public interest exception thus narrowed, plaintiffs that
have traditionally been able to seek relief in Wyoming’s courts will be without a
remedy.222

219

See supra notes 174–92 and accompanying text.

220

See supra notes 193–214 and accompanying text.

221

See supra notes 193–214 and accompanying text.

222

See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text.
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